Bank of Baroda Chief Manager Dies by Suicide Due to Work Pressure


 A horrible event occurred in Baramati, Pune, where 52-year-old Shivshankar Mitra, the branch manager of Bank of Baroda, committed suicide. At the Bank of Baroda branch on Bhigwan Road, he served as the Chief Manager. 


 Finally, the suicide note is delivered. To view the suicide note, please scroll down. The event took place on Thursday, July 17, late at night. Inside the bank's grounds, Shivshankar Mitra was discovered dead. He had gone so far as to hang himself from the limb itself. He was originally from Uttar Pradesh.


Shivshankar Mitra left behind a devastating letter outlining his reasoning for taking his own life. He wrote that the bank was putting a lot of pressure on him. 


 Five days prior, he had submitted a voluntary retirement request, citing his inability to cope with the mounting pressure and workload. However, it is thought that he felt helpless and took this extreme action because senior officials failed to respond. 


 He stated unequivocally in his letter:

“I, Shivshankar Mitra, Chief Manager, Bank of Baroda, Baramati, am committing suicide due to the additional pressure from the bank. Please do not put such pressure on other staff members. Everyone is doing their job with full dedication.”


He also expressed a noble wish — that his eyes be donated, if possible.

In his note, he also made it apparent that no one in his family was accountable and that he was acting alone and rationally. He requested that no one be held responsible for anything other than the stress he was experiencing at work. 


 He sent the following in a heartfelt letter to his family: 

“Priya, forgive me. Mahi, forgive me.”

(These are believed to be his wife and daughter.)


The cause of death has not yet been formally established by the authorities. Nonetheless, the circumstances and the note's contents suggest that work strain is the primary cause. This incident emphasizes how banking workers are experiencing increasing levels of mental stress and how their wellbeing needs to be given careful consideration.



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Bandhan Bank Q1 Net profit declines 65%


Bandhan Bank's Q1 FY26 net profit of Rs 372 crore was a 65 percent decrease from Q1 FY25's Rs 1,063 crore. 


 The bank's overall revenue for the quarter was Rs 6,201.49 crore, which was a slight increase over Q1 FY25's total of Rs 6,081.73 crore. 


 From Rs 2,987 crore in the same quarter last year, NII fell 8%. For the quarter, the Net Interest Margin (NIM) was 6.4%. 


 Operating profit amounted at Rs 1,668 crore, lower than Rs 1,941 crore in Q1 FY25. With Rs 1,147 crore set aside for provisions and contingencies in Q1 FY26—much more than the Rs 523 crore set aside in Q1 FY25—the bank's provisioning expenses remained high.


Regarding asset quality, the bank's gross non-performing asset (NPA) ratio increased from 4.2 percent in the same quarter of the previous year to 5.0 percent in Q1 FY26. 


 The net non-performing asset (NPA) increased from 1.1 percent in FY25 to 1.4 percent. As of June 30, 2025, Bandhan Bank's capital adequacy ratio was 19.4%, which was higher than the 11.5 percent legal threshold. The bank's return on assets (RoA) for the quarter was 0.20 percent, and its total assets were Rs 1,89,403 crore. Business-wise, deposits at Bandhan Bank increased by 16 percent year over year to Rs 1.55 lakh crore. Retail deposits (CASA plus retail term deposits) accounted for 68 percent of the total. The CASA ratio was 27.1% and the CASA deposits were Rs 41,858 crore.



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Indian Overseas Bank(IOB) Q1 Net profit jumps 76% YoY; asset quality and margins

 


Indian Overseas Bank, a state-run institution based in Chennai, announced a staggering 76 percent increase in net income for the June quarter at Rs 1,111.04 crore following a solid performance in all important metrics, particularly the asset quality side. 


According to a statement released by the management on Friday, the lender's total revenue increased 17% to Rs 8,866.47 crore, including other revenue of Rs 1,480.92 crore. 


The net interest margin was 3.04 percent, and the crucial net interest income increased by nearly 13 percent to Rs 2,746 crore. This resulted in an operational margin of 26.59 percent, up from 22.14 percent, and a net profit margin of 12.53 percent, up from 8.36 percent.


Regarding asset quality, the bank's non-performing assets showed a drop both annually and sequentially. Net NPAs decreased from Rs 1,153.51 crore to Rs 816.38 crore, while total NPAs decreased from Rs 6,648.71 crore to Rs 5,178.46 crore. Provisions and contingencies thus decreased from Rs 937.87 crore to Re 844.05 crore. 


 Gross non-performing assets (NPAs) decreased by 92 basis points on an annualized basis and 17 basis points on a sequential basis, from 2.89 to 1.97 in percentage terms. Likewise, net non-performing assets (NPAs) decreased from 0.51% to 0.32, or by 19 and 5 basis points, respectively. The provision coverage ratio increased to 97.47, a 51-bps improvement. Gross advances rose from Rs 2,30,092 crore to Rs 2,62,421 crore, a 14.05 percent increase.


The growth of deposits was 10.75%, rising by Rs 32,111 crore to Rs 3,30,792 crore. Gross advances rose 14.05% to Rs 2,62,421 crore, or Rs 32,329 crores. While the credit cost remained constant at 0.29%, the slippage ratio increased by 3 basis points to 0.10. From Rs 582 crore to Rs 851 crore, the bank recovered an additional Rs 269 crore.

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Axis Bank Q1 Net profit declines 4%


On Thursday, Axis Bank said that its June quarter net profit had decreased by 3.8 percent to Rs 5,806.14 crore from Rs 6,034.64 crore in the same period last year. Net profit decreased by 18 percent on a sequential basis. 


 The bank's operating profit for the quarter was Rs 11,515 crore, up 14% over the previous year. According to a press statement, core operating profit increased 5% year over year to Rs 10,095 crore. In Q1FY26, operating costs increased by 2% year over year.


Compared to the Rs 13,448 recorded in the previous quarter, the net interest income (NII) increased slightly by 0.8 percent to Rs 13,560 crore in the current quarter. Net interest income decreased by 2% sequentially. 


 The bank's Net Interest Margin (NIM) was 3.80% in the April–June quarter, compared to 3.97 percent in the previous quarter and 4.05 percent in the previous year. The gross non-performing asset (NPA) ratio increased from 1.28 percent on March 31, 2025, and 1.54 percent on June 30, 2024, to 1.57 percent on June 30, 2025, indicating a decline in the bank's asset quality during the reporting quarter.


According to the investor presentation, the bank's net non-performing asset (NPA) ratio also rose from 0.33 percent in Q4FY25 and 0.34 percent in Q1FY25 to 0.45 percent in Q1FY26. 


 In the April-June quarter, the bank's gross non-performing assets (NPA) totaled Rs 17,765 crore, up from Rs 14,490 crore in the previous quarter and Rs 16,211 crore in the previous year. In the reporting quarter, net non-performing assets (NPA) were Rs 5,066 crore, down from Rs 3,685 crore in the previous quarter and Rs 3,553 crore in the previous year.


In the June quarter of the fiscal year 2026, the third-largest private sector lender in the nation declared provisions of Rs 3,948 crore, up from Rs 1,359 crore in the March quarter. The overall deposits increased by 9% year over year to 11.61 lakh crore, including 9% growth in current account deposits, 3% growth in savings account deposits, and 12% growth in term deposits. At the conclusion of Q1FY26, CASA deposits accounted for 40% of total deposits.


Total deposits increased 8% year over year on a quarterly average balance basis, with savings account deposits increasing 1%, current account deposits increasing 4%, and term deposits increasing 12%. As of June 30, 2025, the Bank's advances increased by 8% year-over-year and 2% quarter-over-quarter to Rs 10.59 lakh billion. Retail loans made up 59% of the Bank's net advances and increased 6% year over year to Rs 6.23 lakh crore crore.

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Bank of Maharashtra Q1 results, Net profit rises 23%


On Tuesday, July 15, the state-run Bank of Maharashtra Ltd. released its April–June quarter results. The lender's core income, or net interest income, climbed from ₹2,800 crore to ₹3,292 crore, an 18% year-over-year gain. 


 The period's net profit climbed from ₹1,293 crore to ₹1,593 crore, a 23% rise. Despite lower other income than in the same quarter previous year, net profit increased during the quarter. Sequentially, the period's asset quality stayed constant. Both net and gross non-performing assets (NPA) stayed at 0.18% and 1.74%, respectively, from the March quarter.


Compared to the previous quarter's ₹983.29 crore, the quarter's provisions were ₹867.41 crore. On a sequential basis, slippages over the period have increased. At the conclusion of the June quarter, total slippages were ₹727 crore, up from ₹660 crore during the March quarter. 


 While deposits increased by 14% from the same quarter last year to ₹3.05 lakh crore, Bank of Maharashtra reported business growth of 14% from the previous year to ₹5.46 lakh crore in its post-earnings statement. 


 Gross Advances were ₹2.41 lakh crore, increasing 15.34% from the previous year.Net Interest Margins during the June quarter stood at 3.95%, which is nearly the same as 3.97% it reported in the June quarter last year and 4.01% reported during the March quarter.



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PSU Bank Introduces New Role of Floor Manager to Improve Customer Service


Beginning July 11, 2025, UCO Bank will be offering a new position called Floor Manager in all of its branches within the Chandigarh Zone. This action has been taken to improve customer service and guarantee that each and every client who visits the branch is assisted promptly and is completely happy. 


 The issue of subpar customer service has also been brought up on multiple occasions by the Ministry of Finance. Nearly all Indian public sector banks are currently attempting to enhance branch ambiance and customer service.


Roll and Responsibilities

Within the branch, the Floor Manager will serve as the main client contact. Their primary duty will be to ensure that clients are never left unattended and that their issues are promptly resolved. 


 They will keep a careful eye on the branch's entire client experience. To guarantee a seamless banking experience, the Floor Manager will also support and guide clients by guiding them through the branch, pointing them in the direction of the right counters or services, and giving them the information they need.


Coordinating with other branch employees to promptly and effectively resolve customer-related issues is another crucial responsibility of the floor manager. Reducing customer wait times and upholding a good standard of service depend on this collaboration. 


 Additionally, the Floor Manager will be in charge of gathering client feedback. The branch will use this input to pinpoint areas for improvement and service gaps. The Branch Manager will be informed of the observations so that appropriate action can be taken.


UCO Bank has made it clear that the collaboration and support of every branch employee are essential to the success of this new position. Employee collaboration is essential if the floor manager is to achieve the intended improvements. 



 Without their backing, this initiative's goal would be unsuccessful. Every branch in the Chandigarh Zone has been directed to designate a single employee to serve as the Floor Manager. 


Main Focus on Customer Service

Additionally, they must make sure the chosen individual understands the significance of their role and explicitly outline their obligations. The goal is to match this endeavor with the bank's overarching goal of providing excellent customer service.


UCO Bank's action demonstrates its steadfast dedication to operational excellence and client happiness.  The bank hopes to improve service delivery, lower customer complaints, and bolster its stellar service record by implementing the Floor Manager position.

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RBI Officer Grade A & B Recruitment 2025 Notification Out


Recruitment of Grade A and B RBI Officers 2025: Under Advt. No. RBISB/DA/02/2025-26, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Services Board has formally released the recruitment notice for a number of Grade A and Grade B vacancies for the panel year 2024. The following positions are open: Assistant Manager (Rajbhasha), Manager (Technical – Civil & Electrical), Legal Officer, and Assistant Manager (Protocol & Security). From July 11 to July 31, 2025, interested and qualified applicants may apply online at www.rbi.org.in, the official RBI website.

RBI Officer Grade A & B Recruitment 2025 Overview

Recruitment OrganizationReserve Bank of India (RBI)
Advertisement NumberRBISB/DA/02/2025-26
Post NameOfficer Grade A & B (Various Posts)
Vacancies28
Last Date to Apply31 July 2025
Mode of ApplicationOnline
CategoryRBI Officer Grade A & B Recruitment 2025 Notification
Official Websitewww.rbi.org.in

RBI Officer Grade A & B Recruitment 2025 Important Dates

  • Online Application Start Date: 11 July 2025
  • Last Date to Apply: 31 July 2025
  • Pay Exam Fee Last Date: 31 July 2025
  • Exam Date: 16 August 2025

RBI Officer Grade A & B Recruitment 2025 Application Fees

  • GEN / OBC / EWS: ₹850/-
  • SC / ST / PwBD: ₹100/-
  • RBI Staff: ₹0/-
  • Mode of Payment: Online only (Debit Card, Credit Card, Net Banking, etc.)

RBI Officer Grade A & B Recruitment 2025 Age Limit

Here is the age limit for each post under the RBI Grade A and B recruitment as of July 1, 2025:

  • Legal Officer (Grade B): 21 to 32 years
    • Age relaxation: 3 years for LLM holders, 5 years for PhD in Law
  • Manager (Technical – Civil/Electrical): 21 to 35 years
  • Assistant Manager (Rajbhasha): 21 to 30 years
    • Age relaxation: Up to 32 years for PhD holders
  • Assistant Manager (Protocol & Security): 25 to 40 years


RBI Officer Grade A & B Recruitment 2025 Notification PDF

Notification 


Apply Online

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Initial Report released by AAIB on Ahmedabad Air India Plane Crash : Full Report


Initial Report

 On June 12, 2025, an accident involving an Air India B787-8 aircraft registered VT-ANB occurred in Ahmedabad.


FOREWORD

This document has been prepared based on the preliminary facts and evidence collected during the investigation. The information is preliminary and subject to change.


In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Rule 3 of Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents), Rules 2017, the sole objective of the investigation of an Accident/Incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.


The investigation conducted in accordance with the provisions of the above said rules shall be separate from any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability. Consequently, the use of this report for any purpose other than for the prevention of future accidents or incidents could lead to erroneous interpretations.




2. Background

On 12 June 2025, AAIB was notified of an accident involving Air India's B787 aircraft bearing registration VT-ANB at Ahmedabad. As per the notification, the aircraft was operating Flight AI171 from Ahmedabad to Gatwick and crashed at about 0809 UTC immediately after takeoff. The notification was received from the Airport Authority of India and the Airline Operator.


On receipt of the notification, a team of five officers from AAIB including DG, AAIB reached Ahmedabad on the same day. Another three officers from DGCA's Air Safety Directorate arrived from Mumbai to assist in the accident site activities and were put up at disposal of the DG, AAIB. The efforts at the site were led by the DG, AAIB and evidence collection and other site activities were carried out.


The Initial notification of the accident as per ICAO Annex 13 was sent to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), USA which represented the State of Design & Manufacture. As per the information notified to AAIB, the fatalities amongst passengers also included citizens from United Kingdom, Portugal and Canada. The initial notification of the accident as per ICAO Annex 13 was also sent to the AAIB-UK, GPIAAF-Portugal and Transportation Safety Board (TSB)-Canada which represented the other States whose citizens suffered fatalities in the accident.


NTSB, USA appointed an Accredited Representative and Technical Advisers from Boeing, GE and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to assist in this Investigation. A team led by the NTSB Accredited Representative comprising of representatives from Boeing, GE and FAA arrived at Ahmedabad on 15.06.2025 and participated in the Investigation. A team of officials from AAIB, UK also arrived at Ahmedabad and visited the site with DG, AAIB.


The DG-AAIB, in exercise of power conferred to him by the Rule 11 (1) of the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules 2017, appointed Investigation team comprising Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh as Investigator-in-Charge, Mr. Jasbir Singh Larhga as Chief Investigator and, Mr. Vipin Venu Varakoth, Mr. Veeraragavan K and Mr. Vaishnav Vijayakumar as Investigators.


Experienced Pilots, Engineers, Aviation Medicine Specialist, Aviation Psychologist and Flight Recorder Specialists have been taken on board as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to assist the Investigation in the area of their domain expertise.



The last major line maintenance check as per the Aircraft Maintenance Program was L1-1 and L1-2 check carried out at 38504:12 Hrs and 7255 cycles. The next major check (D Check) was due on the aircraft in Dec 2025. The LH Engine with ESN956174 was installed on 01 May 2025 and the RH Engine with ESN956235 was installed on the aircraft on 26 Mar 2025.


There were four CAT ‘C' Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items active on aircraft as of 12.06.2025. These MELs were invoked on 09.06.2025 and validity of these MEL were till 19.06.2025. These MEL were for flight deck door visual surveillance, airport map function, core network, FD printer.


There was a CAT A MEL active w.r.t. Nitrogen generation performance, which was valid till 20.06.2025. There were other Category D MELs/NEFs on the aircraft related to cabin and cargo, the validity of these MELs were also within the due date. All applicable Airworthiness Directives and Alert Service Bulletins were complied on the aircraft as well as engines.


The FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) No. NM-18-33 on December 17, 2018, regarding the potential disengagement of the fuel control switch locking feature. This SAIB was issued based on reports from operators of Model 737 airplanes that the fuel control switches were installed with the locking feature disengaged. The airworthiness concern was not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) by the FAA. The fuel control switch design, including the locking feature, is similar on various Boeing airplane models including part number 4TL837-3D which is fitted in B787-8 aircraft VT-ANB.


As per the information from Air India, the suggested inspections were not carried out as the SAIB was advisory and not mandatory. The scrutiny of maintenance records revealed that the throttle control module was replaced on VT-ANB in 2019 and 2023. However, the reason for the replacement was not linked to the fuel control switch. There has been no defect reported pertaining to the fuel control switch since 2023 on VT-ANB.


5. Damages

The Aircraft was destroyed due to impact with the buildings on the ground and subsequent fire. A total of five buildings shown in the figure below were impacted and suffered major structural and fire damages.



6. Wreckage and Impact

After takeoff, the aircraft impacted the BJ Medical College hostel which is 0.9 NM from the departure end of Runway 23. The Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) was not activated during this event.


The wreckage, from the first impact point till the last identified aircraft item, was distributed in an area of approx. 1000 ft * 400 ft.A layout of the crash site has been given in Fig. 2 indicating the significant parts of the aircraft. The buildings at the wreckage site have been labelled alphabetically from A–F in the layout for easy reference.



As the aircraft was losing altitude, it initially made contact with a series of trees and an incineration chimney inside the Army Medical Corps compound before impacting the northeast wall of the Building A.




The distance between the tree on which the aircraft made its initial contact and the point on the Building A where the aircraft impacted is 293 ft.


As the aircraft moved forward, it continued fragmenting and collided with other structures and vegetation. The impact witness marks on the building and airplane indicated a likely nose-up attitude (about 8°) and wings level.



The vertical stabilizer (fig. 5) separated from the aft fuselage and came to rest about 200 feet south of the initial point of contact with the Building A.




The tail section and the RH Main Landing Gear (MLG) of the aircraft were found embedded in the northeast wall of the Building A while the rest of the airplane continued its forward movement.


As the airplane continued its path across the roof of the Building A, the right engine (fig. 6) struck the concrete water tank structure, separated from the airplane, and rested underneath the water tank structure facing a heading of approx. 226 degrees near the southwest wall of the Building A.




The inboard parts of the right wing were found in Buildings A & B and the areas surrounding the buildings. The right-wing mid-section and the outboard section (fig. 7) was about 280 feet and 520 feet southwest respectively from the initial point of contact with the Building A.




The left main landing gear (LH MLG) and left wing outboard and middle section struck Building C, came to rest approx. 345 feet south from the initial point of contact (fig. 8). The left wing middle section of the wing was stuck in the north corner of the fourth floor of the Building C while the left wing inboard section was lying about 670 feet southwest of the initial point of contact with the Building A (fig. 8).


The nose landing gear (NLG) (fig. 9) was found on the ground about 307 feet southwest from the initial point of contact with Building A.



The left engine (fig. 8) got separated from the airplane and struck the north corner of Building D at the ground level where it remained and was roughly perpendicular to the right engine resting position, at heading of approx. 326 degrees. The wall was pushed into the building and the northwest building column was damaged such that portions of the concrete. Were missing and exposing the internal metal rebar. The engine, remaining portions of attached cowling, and the surrounding area were heavily damaged by fire. After the tail section was brought down, the APU was inspected and found intact inside the APU compartment. The APU air inlet door (fig. 10), which was intact, was found open.


The fuselage fragmented and sustained thermal damage as it traveled along the northwest faces of Buildings C, D, E, and F, with the furthest debris observed at about 765 feet southwest from the initial point of contact with Building A. The flight deck area and windshield support structure came to rest at about 650 feet southwest from the initial point of contact with Building A.



The flap handle assembly (fig. 11) sustained significant thermal damage. The handle was found to be firmly seated in the 5-degree flap position, consistent with a normal takeoff flap setting. The position was also confirmed from the EAFR data. The landing gear lever was in “DOWN” position (fig. 12).


The thrust lever quadrant sustained significant thermal damage. Both thrust levers were found near the aft (idle) position. However, the EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained forward (takeoff thrust) until the impact. Both fuel control switches were found in the “RUN” position (fig. 13). The reverser levers were bent but were in the “stowed” position. The wiring from the TO/GA switches and autothrottle disconnect switches were visible, but heavily damaged.








11. Flight Recorders

The aircraft is equipped with two Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorders (EAFR) part number 866-0084-102. The EAFR are fitted at two locations, one in the tail section at STA 1847 and the other in the forward section at STA 335.


The two EAFRs are similar in construction and record a combined data stream of digital flight data and cockpit voice information, with both stored on the same device.


The aft EAFR receives electrical power from the aircraft's main electrical system. The forward EAFR contains an additional power source from the Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS), a system that provides electrical power to the forward EAFR in the event of a power or bus loss on the aircraft.


This allows the forward EAFR to continue to record available digital flight data and voice data from the Cockpit Area Microphone (CAM), even after power is lost to other aircraft systems.




The aft EAFR was located on the rooftop of Building A on 13th June 2025. The EAFR had impact and thermal damages to the housing. The wires were protruding from the housing and the connectors were burnt.


The forward EAFR was located on 16th June 2025 from the wreckage debris beside Building F. The EAFR was burnt and covered in soot. The EAFR was still attached to the equipment shelf with part of the connector melted but still connected. The ULB was still connected to the housing and the lithium battery was also attached to the equipment shelf, which was removed later prior to transportation.


Both EAFRs were transported from Ahmedabad to AAIB's facility at New Delhi on 24th June 2025. Like various other cases where the data from damaged flight recorders was downloaded by AAIB after sourcing ‘Golden Chassis' and relevant download cables from the DGCA and other Accident Investigation Authorities, in this case the ‘Golden Chassis' (Identical EAFR unit) and download cables required to download data from EAFR were sourced from NTSB, USA. The items arrived on 23rd June 2025.


The download from the FWD EAFR was attempted at the AAIB Lab on 24th June 2025. The CPM was retrieved from the EAFR and found to be in good condition. The CPM was mounted on the Golden Chassis and the raw data was downloaded from the EAFR.


The downloaded flight data contained approximately 49 hours of flight data and 6 flights, including the event flight. The recovered audio was two hours in length and captured the event. Initial analysis of the recorded audio and flight data has been done.


The aft EAFR was substantially damaged and could not be downloaded through conventional means. The CPM was opened to inspect the memory card. The damage was extensive.


12. Accident Flight

On 12th June 2025, Air India's B787-8 aircraft bearing registration VT-ANB arrived at Ahmedabad airport operating flight AI423 from Delhi. The aircraft touched down at 05:47 UTC (11:17 IST) and was parked at bay 34.


The crew of the previous flight (AI423) had made Pilot Defect Report (PDR) entry for status message “STAB POS XDCR” in the Tech Log. The troubleshooting was carried out as per FIM by Air India's on-duty AME, and the aircraft was released for flight at 06:40 UTC.


The aircraft was scheduled to operate flight AI171 from Ahmedabad to Gatwick with ETD 07:40 UTC (13:10 IST). The flight was to be operated by the flight crew comprising an ATPL holder PIC, a CPL holder Co-pilot along with ten cabin crew. Both pilots were based at Mumbai and had arrived at Ahmedabad on the previous day. They had adequate rest period prior to operating the said flight. The co-pilot was Pilot Flying (PF), and the PIC was Pilot Monitoring (PM) for the flight.


The crew of flight AI171 arrived at the airport and underwent preflight Breath Analyzer test at 06:25 UTC and were found fit to operate the flight. The crew is seen arriving at the boarding gate in the CCTV recording at about 07:05 UTC (12:35 IST).


There were 230 passengers on board, out of which 15 passengers were in business class and 215 passengers were in economy class including two infants.


Fuel on board was 54,200 Kgs and as per the load and trim sheet of the flight, the Take-off Weight was 2,13,401 Kgs (Max. allowed - 2,18,183 Kgs). The take-off weight was within allowable limits for the given conditions. There was no ‘Dangerous Goods' on the aircraft.


The calculated V speeds with available conditions at Take-Off were V1 - 153 Kts, Vr - 155 Kts, V2 - 162 Kts.


The A-SMGCS replay of the flight was also carried out after the accident. The aircraft was observed departing from bay 34 at 07:48:38 UTC. The taxi clearance was received at 07:55:15 UTC and the aircraft taxied from the bay at 07:56:08 UTC. The aircraft taxied to Runway 23 via Taxiway R4, backtracked and lined up. The take-off clearance was issued at 08:07:33 UTC. The aircraft started rolling at 08:07:37 UTC.


As per the EAFR data, the aircraft crossed the take-off decision speed V1 and achieved 153 kts IAS at 08:08:33 UTC. The Vr speed (155 kts) was achieved as per the EAFR at 08:08:35 UTC. The aircraft air/ground sensors transitioned to air mode, consistent with liftoff at 08:08:39 UTC.


The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 knots IAS at about 08:08:42 UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.


In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff. The other pilot responded that he did not do so. The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport perimeter wall.


As per the EAFR data, both engines' N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.


RAT in extended position



As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter, at 08:08:56 UTC, the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN.


When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engine's full authority dual engine control (FADEC) automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.


The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1's core deceleration stopped, reversed, and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11 UTC.

At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”. The ATCO enquired about the call sign. ATCO did not get any response but observed the aircraft crashing outside the airport boundary and activated the emergency response.


At 08:14:44 UTC, Crash Fire Tender left the airport premises for rescue and firefighting. They were joined by Fire and Rescue services of Local Administration.


13. Progress of Investigation

The wreckage site activities including drone photography/videography have been completed, and the wreckage has been moved to a secure area near the airport.


Both engines were retrieved from the wreckage site and quarantined at a hangar in the airport. Components of interest for further examinations have been identified and quarantined.


Fuel samples taken from the bowsers and tanks used to refuel the aircraft were tested at the DGCA's lab and found satisfactory.


Very limited amount of fuel samples could be retrieved from the APU filter and Refuel/Jettison valve of left wing. The testing of these samples will be done at a suitable facility capable of carrying out the test with the limited available quantity.


The EAFR data downloaded from forward EAFR is being analyzed in detail. The statement of the witnesses and the surviving passenger have been obtained by the investigators.


Complete analysis of postmortem reports of the crew and the passengers is being undertaken to corroborate aeromedical findings with the engineering appreciation.


Additional details are being gathered based on the initial leads. At this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and/or GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers.


Investigation is continuing and the investigation team will review and examine additional evidence, records, and information that is being sought from the stakeholders.

Source - MoneyControl

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Bank Privatisation News:Government Plans to Decrease Stake in PSU Banks




During the fiscal year 2025–2026, Indian government-owned banks want to sell shares to major investors in order to raise around ₹45,000 crore, or $5.25 billion. According to a senior government source, this would be accomplished through a procedure known as Qualified Institutional Placement (QIP). 


 In the near future, the State Bank of India (SBI), the nation's biggest bank in terms of total assets, will also introduce its QIP. SBI has already authorized plans to raise ₹25,000 crore in equity capital this year earlier in May. By October 2025, the government also intends to finish selling its ownership of IDBI Bank. This is a component of its broader strategy to create money and decrease its holdings in specific public sector banks.


In addition to IDBI Bank and SBI, the government is also preparing to sell shares in the following banks during this financial year: UCO Bank, Bank of Maharashtra, Central Bank of India, Punjab & Sind Bank, Indian Overseas Bank


These stake sales are expected to help the government raise additional funds and increase private participation in public sector banks.


While the actual stake sales are anticipated to start in FY 2026-27, the planning and foundational work will take conducted in FY 2025-26. The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated in this year's Union Budget that it plans to raise ₹47,000 crore by selling its shares in public sector businesses and by selling off government assets. 


 The Inter-Ministerial Group (IMG), a group of ministers and senior officials, reportedly convened on July 8th to choose legal and technical advisors for the stake sale. The Department of Investment and Public Asset Management (DIPAM) and the Department of Financial Services (DFS) served as co-chairs of this group.


Although selling off a stake does not directly constitute privatization, it does eventually result in it. It gradually results in privatization. The government will become less owned as a result of private persons and organizations purchasing its interest. Government ownership will continue to decline with more divestiture, and the bank will be privatized if it drops below 51%. 


 Furthermore, even if the government retains 51% of the business, the remaining 49% is owned by private companies, who attempt to impose their own rules and regulations on government organizations, ultimately introducing a corporate culture.

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Punjab National Bank(PNB) Rejecting TA Bills of Officers for using Own Car without Prior Permission


TA Bills of officers who use their own automobiles for travel without prior authority approval are being rejected by Punjab National Bank (PNB). According to the existing procedure, officials must first obtain approval from the Circle Office before they are allowed to drive their own vehicle, and only then can their TA bill be approved. Even if officers travel for urgent official business, this requirement still holds true. 


AIPNBOA has now vehemently opposed it. The All India PNB Officers' Association (AIPNBOA) has strongly urged the Punjab National Bank's (PNB) top management to immediately revoke this policy. Citing the policy's detrimental effects on officer morale and efficiency, the association has called it "demotivating" and "impractical."


AIPNBOA has now vehemently opposed it. The All India PNB Officers' Association (AIPNBOA) has strongly urged the Punjab National Bank's (PNB) top management to immediately revoke this policy. Citing the policy's detrimental effects on officer morale and efficiency, the association has called it "demotivating" and "impractical." 


 In a letter to PNB's MD and CEO, the AIPNBOA General Secretary requested that he investigate the matter. The problem has gained attention after the Staff Welfare and Compensation Cell (SWCC) allegedly denied a number of travel allowance (TA) requests, stating that prior authorization from authorities was not obtained.

The association highlighted that officers frequently need to travel at short notice for a wide range of duties, including:


Stock verification

Loan sanction and follow-up visits

End-use verification of loans

Security assessments

Field verification of borrower and customer addresses

Locker rent recovery

Legal and recovery work

Customer outreach and financial awareness programs

Business development and loan recovery drives


AIPNBOA claims that officers are not being reimbursed for official travel in their personal cars just because they did not get prior consent, which is frequently impractical in real-world scenarios. Field officers have reportedly been frustrated and dissatisfied as a result of these TA bills being rejected. 


 These duties cannot wait for official approvals, particularly in circumstances that are urgent or time-sensitive. Even in metropolitan and semi-urban areas, the group noted, personal vehicles are the only dependable means of timely transportation because public transportation is either inaccessible or inappropriate.


The letter also highlighted problems that branch heads and senior officials experience since, according to the current regulations, they have to get permission from the Circle Head before they can drive in their own car for official business. Due to his hectic schedule, Circle Head might not be able to provide approval right away, which causes delays and obstacles in the process. 


 The group also voiced worries that the general culture these policies foster shows a "lack of trust" in cops. According to the letter, "it is as if every officer is considered a thief until proven otherwise." This is detrimental to the working atmosphere in addition to being discouraging, especially for junior officers who are working under pressure in the field.

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